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Abstract 
In spite of the presence of intersectionality as a concept in  
feminist literature for over twenty-five years, the State 
Policy, across the world, has been ignorant towards the 
interplay of identities and its role in the discrimination 
law jurisprudence. This article claims that a legitimate 
accommodation of a multi-ground claim under the Right 
to Equality regime, present in various legal systems, shall 
be a purposive step towards substantive equality. The 
article also highlights certain frailties associated with 
Intersectionality and introduces the age-old dilemma 
surrounding the formulation of State Policy, as to whether 
it should be ―identity-neutral‖ like anti-classification 
principle, or ―identity-sensitive‖ like intersectionality 
itself. The article also introduces the vulnerability theory 
proposed by Martha Fineman, as a post identity 
approach. The final analysis, explains how the two 
theories can coexist so that the State Policy can move 
towards substantive equality, and thus, mitigate the 
horrors of discrimination.   
Keywords: Discrimination, Equality, Identity, Intersectionality, 
Vulnerability 
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I. Introduction 
This article seeks to understand how identities play a seminal role 
in and around the development of discrimination law 
jurisprudence, across the world. The aim is to examine how the 
identity of an individual in isolation and coupled with his other 
identities provides for an inter-sectional claim, and most 
importantly, to assess the reception of such claims by the 
adjudicating courts. The article looks into claims made under 
various jurisdictions and how an inter-sectional claim still struggles 
to find its ground, even after being around for more than 25 years 
in the legal literature. The paper, initially deals with an inquiry into 
how discrimination laws have confined their application to 
singular claims arising out of discrimination based on one of the 
listed grounds and have failed to recognize a claim arising out of 
various grounds, due to an inter-play of various identities of an 
individual. For instance, a Muslim woman can face discrimination 
due to her sex as well as due to her religion. Therefore, she would 
share experiences of discrimination with Hindu women, as well as 
with Muslim men. Then again, she would have certain unique 
experiences by virtue of her being a ‗woman‘ and a ‗Muslim‘. 
The interpretation of the discrimination laws has foreclosed the 
routes to recognize such claims of intersectional discrimination. 
This paper also takes examples of experiences of Black women in 
the United States of America, among others, to analyze 
qualitatively, a quantitative sense of a multi-ground claim.1 
Further, the article addresses and acknowledges various limitations 
to an identity-approach towards discrimination laws, and how 
identity-based studies of discrimination have quintessentially; put 
the objective of ensuring equality on the wayside of equality laws. 
The article then puts forward the ‗vulnerability theory‘, developed 
by Martha Fineman2, as an alternative framework for 
understanding substantive equality, which ordains a positive and 
                                                          
1 Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and 
Antiracist Politics, 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. (1989). [Crenshaw] 
2 Martha A Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the 
Human Condition, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 9-15 (2008). [Fineman] 
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determined role of a welfare state. The paper concludes by 
addressing the flaws of such post-identity approaches and by 
advocating the need for revising the theory and concept of 
interdependence. A strong ‗paternalistic‘ state coupled with 
‗intersectionality‘ can be a useful construct to design social policy, 
is the strong contention put forth by the author. 
II. Intersectionality Theory 
―A race was not fair if one runner left the starting line three 
hundred years before the other‖.3 
Martin Luther King Jr. used this metaphor to make the Americans 
understand the plight of the victims of racial discrimination, and 
how it is imperative to bring the historically disadvantaged subjects 
of the State, to the same pedestal as of those who haven‘t faced 
such discriminatory practices. The conversation around 
discrimination and the jurisprudence behind it begins from this 
context.  
The history of citizens and their groups are innately linked to 
discriminatory practices either deployed by them or on them. This 
discrimination and injustice caused is based on various identities 
like religion, language, gender, caste, etc.4 Such historical 
disadvantages and disabilities associated with certain members of 
our society has been substratum of the discrimination law 
jurisprudence in and around the world. As an individual living in a 
social environment and being an integral part of the social order, 
we tend to acquire various identities. Discrimination laws in all the 
jurisdictions are anchored on our identities.  
Our daily experiences are creatures of interplay between these 
identities. Though the modern world has accepted the existence of 
several identities in one person the ramifications of such multiple 
identities have not been translated into the interpretation of 
discrimination laws across the world. When we use terms such as a 
                                                          
3 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT, 147 (Penguin 
USA, 2002). 
4Abhiram Singh v. C.D Commachen (Dead) by Lrs. &Ors, 2017 SCC 
OnLine SC 9. 
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―Black Lesbian‖ or a ―Poor Muslim Woman‖ there is a symbiosis of 
several identities of that person. A ‗Black Lesbian‘ at one point of 
time belongs to the community of Black persons as well as to the 
Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Queer (LGBTQ) community. At 
the same time, she forms a part of a distinct set of ―Black Lesbians‖, 
who shall have isolated experiences by virtue of such a unique 
permutation of identities. Similarly, a ‗poor Muslim woman‘ can 
identify herself as being poor, a Muslim by religion, and a woman 
by her gender, thereby experiencing the world from each of the 
single axes, yet forming a new identity by virtue of the existence of 
these three identities in one person. The recognition of such a 
distinction in gender politics seems to be amiss from the 
interpretation of discrimination laws by the courts today. 
Intersectionality is an approach to analyze an individual‘s identity. 
It recognizes the fact that different identity categories can intersect 
and co-exist in the same individual in a way which creates a 
qualitatively different experience, when compared to any of the 
individual characteristics involved.5 Kimberlé Crenshaw, who 
coined the term, used experiences of ‗Black women‘ to explain how 
the ‗single axis‘ model of identity and the ‗anti-racist‘ campaigns in 
the U.S.A. have failed them as their unique sufferings were silenced 
by the dominate narrative of ‗race‘ and ‗sex‘, individually.6 
Intersectionality, as a principle denies that identity can be dissected 
into ―mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis‖7. 
The theory comes into play where one identity marker viz. race, 
caste, gender, etc. interacts with another identity marker, giving 
rise to a distinct experience of discrimination against the subject. 
However, if individual markers are observed, they only highlight 
independent instances of discrimination. Therefore, when 
discrimination is faced in the former form, that experience of dual 
minority, has not been recognized by Courts, nor can there be seen 
a provision for any remedy under law.8 
                                                          
5 Ben Smith, Substantive Equality: A Comparative and Theoretical Perspective, 
16 Equal Rights Review 73, 73 (2016). 
6 Crenshaw, supra note 1. 
7Id at 139. 
8Id at 150. 
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II. 1 Types of Multiple Ground Claims 
It is important to distinguish an intersectional claim from other 
types of multiple ground claims. Generally, there are three ways in 
which an individual can suffer discrimination. The first is when an 
individual suffers discrimination on different grounds on separate 
occasions. For instance, a person from a Scheduled Caste with a 
disability, might on one occasion experience discrimination due to 
his caste, and at some other occasion face discrimination due to his 
disability. Each incident can be assessed on a single ground and 
compensation can be awarded accordingly. This type of 
discrimination is called ‗sequential multiple discrimination.9 It 
reflects hegemonic discourses of identity politics that disregards 
the invisible experiences of the marginalized members of a specific 
social category and constructs a homogenized ‗right way‘ to be the 
practiced rule.10 A second manifestation occurs when a person is 
discriminated against on the same occasion, but in two different 
ways. This type of discrimination occurs when a person is 
discriminated against on more than one ground in the same 
instance and thus, the discrimination faced by the individual on 
each ground gets compounded. This creates an additional burden.11 
For example, a gay woman might claim that she has been subject to 
harassment both because she is a woman and because she is gay at 
the same time. This kind of discrimination is called ‗additive 
discrimination‘ as each of the constituent discriminatory instances 
gives rise to an independent cause of action as the person has been 
subjected to discrimination on both grounds simultaneously.12 An 
                                                          
9Sandra Fredman, Intersectional discrimination in EU gender equality and non-
discrimination law, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 27 (Mar. 29, 2017, 10:00 
AM), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/ document/ files/ 
intersectionality.pdf. [Fredman] 
10 N. Yuval-Davies, Intersectionality and Feminist Politics, 13 EUR. J. 
WOMENS STUD, 195 (2006). 
11Carles, I., Jubany-Baucells, O., GendeRace – The Use of Racial Anti-
Discrimination Laws: Gender and Citizenship in a Multicultural Context, 72 
(Nov. 27, 2017, 9:35 PM)http:// genderace.ulb.ac.be/ rapports/ 
GENDERACE%20FINAL%20REPORT%20sent.pdf. 
12Fredman, supra at 7. 
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example can be found in Perera v. Civil Service Commission,13 in 
which the appellant had contended discrimination by the 
recruitment policy of the respondent, based on grounds of 
nationality, age and command over the English language. This is 
considered to be an additive form of discrimination as each ground 
made it less likely for the appellant to get a job. Though additive 
discrimination includes multiple grounds of discrimination, the 
independent and mutually exclusive nature of such protected 
grounds is maintained intact. 
The third type is different to the aforementioned kinds of multi-
ground discrimination, in the sense that it is not merely a 
sequential addition of two discriminatory grounds, but rather the 
resultant discrimination is ‗synergistic‘.14 This subject is known as 
the ‗Intersectional theory‘. Intersectionality tries to explain how 
interaction of all identities of an individual tends to create a 
complex identity. For example, Crenshaw cites De Graffenreid v. 
General Motors Assembly Division15, to explain intersectional 
discrimination. In this case, five black women, being the most 
recent entries to the company, were made redundant first. Since  
white women and black men were among those who escaped 
redundancy, the black women complainants could not claim that 
they had been less favorably treated on grounds of either gender or 
race alone. It was only because they were both black and female 
that they were discriminated against.16 White women may face 
sexism but can be beneficiaries of racism and conversely, black men 
may be victims of racism but perpetrators of sexism. It is only the 
separate class of ‗black women‘ that faces both forms of 
discrimination, at the same time. 
II. 2 Horizontal Inequalities and Intersectionality 
Horizontal inequalities are, primarily, inequalities among 
culturally defined (or constructed) groups marked by specific 
                                                          
13Perera v. Civil Service Commission, [1983] IRLR 166. 
14 Crenshaw, supra at139. 
15 DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division, 413 F Supp. 142 
(US Federal Court of Appeals). [DeGraffenreid] 
16Fredman, supra at 28.  
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identities, like gender, race, ethnicity or religion. It is in contrast to 
the concept of vertical inequality which deals with inequalities 
amongst individuals. This theory was developed by Francis 
Stewart.  
The sort of groups we are discussing here are ethnic 
groups – where history, language, symbols and 
behavior differentiate people; immigrant groups, 
differentiated by history, and sometimes by 
physiology, language, etc.; racial groups, 
differentiated by physiology, history and sometimes 
language, and religious groups, differentiated by 
adherence to particular beliefs and membership into 
religious institutions. In each case, the boundaries 
are often unclear; in each case, people can sometimes 
change membership (particularly in the case of 
religion); yet in each case, there are recognized 
markers that differentiate people.17 
Vertical inequalities have been justified as necessary for 
competition and allocational efficiency. Horizontal inequalities 
have proved to be a handicap, because they are beyond an 
individual‘s control. There are also reasons to believe that an 
increase in the number of horizontal inequalities have a significant 
impact on the increase in violence and conflicts.18 Francis Stewart 
gives examples of Blacks in the US, Northerners in Ghana and 
Aborigines in Australia, where individuals may improve, but the 
group as a whole, rarely does. Like intersectionality, horizontal 
inequalities also are premised on identities, unlike vertical 
inequalities. Therefore, there seems to be a legitimate overlap. 
However, horizontal inequalities tend to be similar to intersection 
of dimensions of deprivation, such as a group being deprived 
                                                          
17 Frances Stewart & Arnim Langer, Horizontal Inequalities: Explaining 
persistence and change, CRISE (Oct. 23, 2017, 2:28 PM) http:// 
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.559.1632&rep=rep1
&type=pdf. 
18Frances Stewart, Horizontal inequalities as a cause of conflict, UNIVERSITY 
OF BRADFORD (Oct. 23, 2017, 3:00 PM) https:// www.bradford.ac.uk/ 
social-sciences/ media/ socialsciences/ BDLStewart.pdf. 
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simultaneously in both political and economic dimensions. So, with 
horizontal inequalities, there is a special emphasis on dimensional 
intersectionality as, for a group, only one identity functions as 
being the point of commonality within the group. 
Intersection of disadvantaged or advantaged identities occurs as a 
consequence of every person having multiple identities. Empirical 
investigation with respect to horizontal inequalities have identified 
intersecting horizontal inequalities of this kind - notably that 
women in marginalized groups typically form the most deprived 
category.19 However, till date not a great deal of emphasis has been 
put on this type of intersection in horizontal inequalities, since the 
aim has been to identify the consequences of horizontal inequalities 
for social stability and cohesion, not to identify group 
characteristics of the most deprived individuals. However, the 
intersection of identities- such as being a woman and a slave, finds 
lesser relevance in discourses around horizontal and vertical 
inequalities than dimensional intersectionality.  
Dimensional intersectionality is of more relevance to the 
persistence of horizontal inequalities because, deprivation (or 
privilege) in a range of dimensions reinforce deprivation in each 
individual dimension and deprivation overall (or privilege).20 In 
spite of its similarity, there are two differences in intersectionality 
and horizontal inequality approach. Firstly, Intersectionality 
focuses on finding intersection of identities and how such 
intersections create disadvantage. Horizontal inequality approach, 
on the other hand, looks for causes and consequences of such 
horizontal inequalities which are a reason for conflict and social 
cohesion. Secondly, horizontal inequality approach tends to look at 
identities/dimensions which are likely to be provocative, while 
intersectionality looks at identities, for example - income, which 
affects personal well-being too.21However, the policy approach to 
                                                          
19 Francis Stewart, Horizontal inequalities and intersectionality, MAITREYEE 
E-BULLETIN OF THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT & CAPABILITY 
ASSOCIATION, (Oct. 26, 2017, 03:00 PM), https:// www.odi.org/ sites/ 
odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9173.pdf 
20Id at 11 
21Id at 12 
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these two theories is similar, if not identical. Both methods put 
emphasize on removing discrimination, and highlight the 
significance of affirmative action. The author suggests that while 
the inequality approach would be particularly concerned with 
correction of group horizontal inequality as a whole, 
intersectionality would be more concerned with categories that are 
deprived due to intersection of identities. 
II. 3 Application of Intersectionality theory by Courts in various 
jurisdictions 
II. 3(i) United States of America (US) 
One of the most famous examples of the US Courts applying single 
axis models was Geduldig v. Aiello22, where courts did not recognize 
an intersectional discrimination of a pregnant woman based on her 
gender and pregnancy, but rather, found that discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy did not constitute discrimination on the basis of 
gender, but merely a distinction between pregnant and non-
pregnant women. 
Apart from the case noted above23, Crenshaw discusses two other 
cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 1964, that is, 
Moore v. Hughes Helicopter Inc.24 (hereinafter ―Moore‖) and Payne v. 
Travenol Laboratories Inc.25 (hereinafter ―Payne‖). In Moore, a black 
woman alleged discrimination by Hughes Helicopters Inc., during 
selection of employees for superior positions. In the suit, Moore 
had requested the case to be converted into a class action, on behalf 
of all female employees, but this plea was categorically rejected by 
the court because, as a Black female, she could not represent white 
women. Therefore, the discrimination brought forth could not be 
considered by the court as one of sexual discrimination.  
In Payne, Black female workers had brought a class action against 
the respondent company that had recruited them for positions that 
had a low pay. The court accepted the racial discrimination plea of 
                                                          
22Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974). 
23DeGraffenreid,supra note 13. 
24 Moore v. Hughes Helicopter Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983). 
25 Payne v. Travenol Laboratories Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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the women, but refused the plaintiffs to represent black men and 
accepted the defendant‘s request to narrow the class to Black 
women only.26 Through these cases adjudicated by the courts in the 
U.S.A, it can be fairly assumed that the discrimination law 
jurisprudence in the U.S.A, has not been able to accommodate 
intersectional claims, especially those where the identity of race 
and sex intersect.    
II. 3(ii) United Kingdom (UK) 
The United Kingdom discrimination law jurisprudence has 
developed through legislations like the Race Relations Act, 1976, 
Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, Equality Act, 2010 and Employment 
Equality Regulations.27 However, it can be observed that even after 
having a spectrum of legislations regarding discrimination, all of 
them perpetrate a ‗single axis‘ model. None of the legislations make 
any provision for a multiple discrimination claim, let alone for an 
intersectional one. According to the Equality Act, 2010 a 
discriminative act is prohibited against statutorily defined 
protected characteristics28 like age, disability, gender re-
assignment, etc.29 The ‗protected characteristics‘ are independent 
and considered mutually exclusive. However, in 2009, the 
Government of UK published a discussion paper, assessing the 
inherent faults in the equality legislations and proposed 
recognition to an intersectional claim to be included in the Equality 
Bill (now, Equality Act, 2010). The prospective Section 14 contains 
provisions for ‗combined discrimination‘ on dual ‗protected 
                                                          
26 Crenshaw, supra at 148. 
27 Government Equalities Office, Equality Act 2010: guidance, GOV.UK, 
(Nov. 21, 2017, 12:25 AM),https://www.gov.uk/guidance/equality-act-
2010-guidance. 
28 United Kingdom Equality Act, § 13, (2010) -Direct discrimination (1) A 
person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected 
characteristic, A treats B less favorably than A treats or would treat others. 
29 United Kingdom Equality Act, § 4, (2010) -The following characteristics 
are protected characteristics— age; disability; gender reassignment; 
marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or 
belief; sex; sexual orientation. 
Shwetank Sharma                       A Comparative analysis of Intersectionality 
11 
 
characteristics‘.30 Nonetheless, the incumbent government declined 
to bring this provision into force and while there is recognition in 
policymaking that intersectional discrimination exists and is not 
addressed adequately by the existing law, it has not led to changes 
in the law.31 Yet, courts have not been so reluctant in addressing 
issues relating to multiple ground discriminations.  
In Bahl v. The Law Society and Others32, an Employment Tribunal 
(ET) found that Dr. Bahl was subjected to discrimination based on 
race and sex at the same time. But, the decision was overturned by 
the Employment Appellate Tribunal (EAT) and the Court of 
Appeal, on the basis that the Tribunal had failed to adjudicate upon 
the claims independently. 
This strict sense of interpretation of discrimination laws came 
under consideration in O’Reilly v. BBC and another.33 Ms. O‘Reilly 
alleged that she had been removed from the program due to 
discrimination on the combination of grounds of age and sex. BBC 
argued that if the Employment Tribunal were to find that the 
reason for removing Ms. O‘Reilly was truly due to the combination 
of her age and sex, this would not amount to unlawful 
discrimination, because combined discrimination is not prohibited 
under the pre-Equality Act legislation. The ET found this argument 
to be flawed, because the particular protected characteristic need 
not be the sole or even the principal reason why a person suffers 
detrimental treatment, in order for a claim on that ground to 
                                                          
30 United Kingdom Equality Act, § 14, (2010) -Combined discrimination: 
dual characteristics (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, 
because of a combination of two relevant protected characteristics, A 
treats B less favorably than A treats or would treat a person who does not 
share either of those characteristics. 
31 Executive Director, Equality Bill: Assessing the impact of a multiple 
discrimination provision, EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST, 3.5 (Oct. 25, 2017, 9:00 
AM) http:// www.equalrightstrust.org/ ertdocumentbank/ The% 20 
Equal%20Rights%20Trust%20Multiple%20discrimination%20Consultatio
n%20Response.pdf. 
32 Bahl v. The Law Society and Others, [2004] IRLR 799. 
33 O‘Reilly v. BBC and another, Case no. 2200423/2010, 10th January 2011 
(UK). 
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succeed. If a claimant is able to show that her sex is a part of the 
reason for detrimental treatment, she will succeed in a sex 
discrimination claim. If she proves that age was a part of the 
reason, she will succeed in her age discrimination claim. Both 
claims can succeed, taken separately, which will lead to a 
conclusion that the treatment was both on the grounds of age and 
sex – thus allowing a tribunal to make a finding of discrimination 
on multiple grounds. Though this case proved to be a watershed 
judgment for inclusion of a multiple ground discrimination claim, 
it can be argued that even this case could not reproduce the essence 
of intersectionality as both claims are looked at as independent 
claims, capable of being proved without the help of the other.34 
It has been argued that such a distinction is only academic in 
nature and till the time judgments are making provisions for 
multiple ground claims, there is no practical significance of such 
discussions.35 
II. 3(iii) India 
Article 1536 of the Constitution of India, along with various statutes 
enacted by the Parliament, is the source of discrimination law 
jurisprudence in India. For a purposive understanding of the 
jurisprudence underlying the aforementioned Article, an 
interpretation of the phrase ‗on grounds only of‘37as linking the 
basis of discrimination to the listed or constitutionally protected 
grounds, is required to be done.38 
                                                          
34Anna Beale et al; Equalities briefing six: Dual discrimination, CLOISTERS, 
(Oct. 26, 2017, 6:30 PM), https:// www.cloisters.com/ images/ easyblog 
_images/45/viewpoint-6---dual-discrimination.pdf. [Beale] 
35Beale, supra at 3. 
36 INDIAN CONST., Art 15, cl. 1. 
37 INDIAN CONST., Art 15, cl. 1. 
38 Shreya Atrey, Through the Looking Glass of Intersectionality: Making Sense 
of Indian Discrimination Jurisprudence under Article 15, 16 Equal Rights 
Review 160, 161 (2016). [Atrey] 
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The meaning of ‗on grounds only of‘ in Section 298(1) came to be 
considered by the Bombay High Court in Punjab v.Daulat Singh39. 
Lord Thankerton, writing for the majority held that: 
[I]t is not a question of whether the impugned Act is 
based only on one or more of the grounds specified 
in Section 298(1), but whether its operation may 
result in a prohibition only on these grounds. The 
proper test as to whether there is a contravention of 
the sub-section is to ascertain the reaction of the 
impugned Act on the personal right conferred by the 
sub-section. 
Thus, a reasonable interpretation of this case, perforce, suggests 
that the phrase ‗on grounds only of‘ signifies the basis of 
discrimination to be on one or more grounds under Section 298(1).40 
The abovementioned test, popularized as the ‗result or effect‘ test, 
was upheld, subsequently, in Bombay v. Bombay Education Society41 
case.  The case involved restriction of admission to English 
speaking pupils viz. Anglo Indians of European descent in the 
English medium schools of Bombay, which was contended as a 
violation of Article 15 read with Article 29 of the Constitution of 
India. The Government, on behalf of the educational institution, 
claimed that the restriction enforced was not discrimination based 
only on ground of religion, race, caste, language or any of them 
―but on the ground that such denial will promote the advancement 
of the national language and facilitate the imparting of education 
through the medium of the pupil‘s mother tongue.‖42 
This object and purpose based justification of the government was 
denied by the Court as an incorrect test in the light of Daulat Singh, 
and the Court proceeded with applying Lord Thankerton‘s test in 
                                                          
39 State of Punjab v.Daulat Singh, (1946) 73 IA 59, (1946) FCR 1 (India). 
40 2 H.M SEERVAI., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 558 (4th ed, 
2001). 
41 Bombay v. Bombay Education Society, (1955) 1 SCR 568, 581, 583–584. 
42Id. at 582. 
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that ―[w]hatever the object, the immediate ground and direct cause for the 
denial‖ dictates the inquiry.43 
In Mahadeb v.Dr BB Sen,44 Justice Mukharji opined that: 
The word ―only‖ in Article 15(1) is of great 
importance and significance which should not be 
missed. The impugned law must be shown to 
discriminate because of sex alone. If other factors in 
addition to sex come into play in making the 
discriminatory law, then such discrimination does 
not, in my judgment, come within the provision of 
Article 15(1) of the Constitution.45 
Similarly, in Anjali Roy v. State of West Bengal,46 the Calcutta High 
Court held: 
What the Article forbids is discrimination and 
discrimination based solely on all or any of the 
grounds mentioned in the Article (…) the 
discrimination which is forbidden [in Article 15(1)] 
is only such discrimination as is based solely on the 
ground that a person belongs to a particular race or 
caste or professes a particular religion or was born at 
a particular place or is of a particular sex and on no 
other ground.47 
Thus, we can observe that the discrimination law jurisprudence in 
India, developed around discrimination based on sex, coupled with 
other considerations mentioned under Article 15. Various other 
judgments of the courts in India have added to the understanding 
of prohibition of discrimination by a single axis model viz. 
                                                          
43Atrey, supra at 166. 
44Mahadeb v. Dr BB Sen, AIR 1951 Cal 563. [Mahadeb]  
45Mahadeb,supra at 28. 
46 Anjali Roy v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 Cal 825.  
47Id at 839.  
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Dattatraya Motiram More v. State of Bombay48, Government of Andhra 
Pradesh v. PB Vijaykumar49, Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab University50, etc.  
It is interesting to note that the logic of serving the interests of 
women through clause (3) of Article 15, comes heavily couched in 
the language of protectionism, viewing women as the weaker sex, 
thus, reinforcing the very stereotypes, discrimination is meant to 
combat.51 The continuous course of judgments adhering to the 
textual view of biological understanding of sex, as differed from 
gender, under Article 15(1) and unquestioned paternalistic 
protectionism of Article 15(3)52 was interrupted, and rightfully so, 
by the decision in Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India53.  The case 
was a constitutional challenge to an enactment which prohibited 
employment of woman in premises, where alcohol was consumed 
in public. The Supreme Court of India declared the provision as 
unconstitutional and quoted the decision of US Supreme Court in 
Frontiero v. Richardson54. Thus, this case changed the course of 
discussions around gender discrimination and protectionism, 
under the discrimination law jurisprudence for a short while. But, 
even today the justification of discrimination based on more than 
one ground is problematic, unsatisfactory, and in most cases, 
unrecognized. 
Though the jurisprudence behind discrimination laws in India still 
struggles to accommodate multiple ground claims and 
intersectionality, the Anti-Discrimination and Equality Bill, 2016 
introduced by Dr. Shashi Tharoor, Member of Parliament, tries to 
                                                          
48Dattatraya Motiram More v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 Bom 311.  
49 Government of Andhra Pradesh v. PB Vijaykumar, AIR 1995 SC 1648. 
50 Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab University, AIR 2003 SC 3331. 
51Atrey, supra at170. 
52 INDIAN CONST., Art 15, cl 3. 
53 Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1.  
54Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764. ―There can be no 
doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex 
discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an 
attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, 
not on a pedestal, but in a cage.‖ 
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incorporate this approach.55 Section 3 of this Bill has defined 
―Protected Characteristic‖ with a specific acknowledgement and 
recognition to a multiple ground claim.56 Section 1(iii) provides for 
a provision of inclusion of a multiple ground claim and a true 
intersectional claim. Also, Section 4 of the same Bill defines 
―protected group‖ and the Illustration No. 2 gives an apt example 
of how the Bill seeks to include a multi-ground claims.57 Section 5 
of the Bill defines ―disadvantaged group‖ by giving an illustrative 
enumeration of such groups based on caste, race, sex, gender 
identity, pregnancy, sexual orientation, disability, linguistic 
identity, etc. Further, the same section also defines the 
―disadvantaged group‖ as a combination of any of the enumerated 
groups, which provisions a possible cross-over between the groups 
and can be a legitimate ground for an intersectional claim.  
II. 4 Adjudication of Intersectionality Claims - India 
Predominantly, there have been two identities which have 
occupied prime positions in the narrative of feminist movements in 
the West, that is, gender and race/ethnic origin.58 Examples can be 
                                                          
55 Suhrith Parthasarathy, To be equal before the law, THE HINDU (21 
Nov. 2017, 9:40 PM) http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/To-be-
equal-before-the-law/article14479752.ece. 
56 Anti-Discrimination and Equality Bill, § 3, Bill No. 289 of 2016, (2016) - 
A "protected characteristic" in relation to a citizen of India means— (i) 
caste, race, ethnicity, descent, sex, gender identity, pregnancy, sexual 
orientation, religion and belief, tribe, disability, linguistic identity, HIV 
status, nationality, marital status, food preference, skin tone, place of 
residence, place of birth or age; or (ii) any other personal characteristic 
which,— (a) is either outside a person's effective control, or constitutes a 
fundamental choice, or both; and (b) defines at least one group that suffers 
or is in danger of suffering widespread and substantial disadvantage, 
when compared with other groups defined by the same characteristic; or 
(iii) a combination of any of the above. 
57 Anti-Discrimination and Equality Bill, § 4, Bill No. 289 of 2016, (2016) - 
Illustration No.2- Muslim women are a protected group defined by a 
combination of two protected characteristics: sex and religion.  
58 Felice Batlan, Race, Gender, and, Feminist Legal Advocacy during the Long 
Civil Rights Movement, JOTWELL (26 Nov. 2017, 9:00 PM) 
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taken of various European Nations which have separate bodies 
addressing such discriminations viz. former Commission of Racial 
Equality in Britain and the Sexuality Ombudsman in Sweden59. 
However, across the world, the number of protected grounds from 
discrimination has dramatically increased, for instance, Article 15 
of Indian Constitution includes place of birth, religion and caste, as 
additional grounds, for, they are very specific to discriminatory 
practices prevalent in India. Therefore, in European Union as well 
as other common law jurisdictions, there is a constant pressure 
towards not just addressing and adjudicating multiple grounds of 
discrimination, but also their interaction in the form of 
intersectionality in a single piece of legislation and by a single 
body.  In India, the Constitution provides for a robust number of 
grounds of discrimination and protection from the State in Articles 
14, 15 and 16. Under Article 32 and Article 226, in case of any 
violation of a fundamental right, the Supreme Court or High Court, 
respectively, can adjudicate the matter under their writ jurisdiction. 
But, there are various legislations laying special focus on caste 
based discrimination and untouchability, like Protection of Civil 
Rights Act, 1955, The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes 
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, etc. The plethora of legislations 
cast a duty on the State to prevent such discrimination, but only of 
the kind of discrimination that is provided for, in that specific Act.  
Intersectionality has not been recognized in India as a valid form of 
discrimination, as explained above. The only recourse for an 
intersectional claim is to file a writ petition at the High Court or the 
Supreme Court, seeking redress under Article 226 or 32 for a 
violation of the rights mentioned under Article 15 or 16, as the case 
maybe. However, the aforementioned judgments of the Indian 
Courts show that a multiple-ground claim, let alone intersectional 
ones, cannot be admitted under the Right to Equality regime in the 
Constitution of India, and claimants, for all intent and purposes, 
have been rendered remediless.  The Anti-Discrimination and 
                                                                                                                                    
https://legalhist.jotwell.com/race-gender-and-feminist-legal-advocacy-
during-the-long-civil-rights-movement/. 
59 European Commission, A Comparative Analysis Of Non-Discrimination 
Law In Europe,EUROPA,(Nov. 21 2017, 12:45 AM)http:// ec.europa.eu/ 
justice/discrimination/files/comparative_analysis_nd__2015.pdf. 
Christ University Law Journal Vol. 7, No. 1                               ISSN 2278-4322 
18 
 
Equality Bill, 2016, as mentioned earlier, provides a scheme for 
institutionalization of Intersectionality. Apart from including 
intersectionality in the definition of ‗Protected Characteristic‘ and 
‗Protected Group‘, it also provides for establishment of a Central 
Equality Commission, which shall have powers to eliminate 
discrimination, promotion of awareness, etc. and also, in 
consultation with State Equality Commission, issue guidelines for 
protection from discrimination. Both the Commissions have 
judicial powers with State Commission having original jurisdiction. 
The Bill also provides for various kinds of remedies available 
against intersectional discrimination. The High Court has been 
vested with the appellate jurisdiction in this Bill.60 This Bill alone, 
provides for a successful intersectional claim which can be 
adjudicated upon by the Equality Commissions, apart from the 
constitutional remedies under Article 32 and 226, which, due to 
plethora of precedents on multiple ground claims, have been made 
redundant. The establishment of this Commission brings several 
kinds of discriminations under a single legislation and before one 
body, thus ensuring ease in access of justice, speedy procedure, and 
clarity. However, the Bill is still pending in the Parliament. 
III. Substantive Equality beyond Intersectionality 
Before understanding the need to look beyond just the 
intersectionality theory, to bring home the idea of ‗substantive 
equality‘, it becomes imperative to understand the phraseology 
behind ‗substantive equality‘ and how it is different from ‗formal 
equality‘. From there we can discuss how to achieve substantive 
equality, which is a much wider and holistic ideology towards 
welfare legislations and principles governing adjudication. 
III. 1 Formal Equality versus Substantive Equality 
The most widespread and replicated understanding of equality 
comes from Aristotle‘s dictum that equality meant ―things that are 
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alike should be treated alike‖.61 Formal Equality, essentially, 
promotes individualistic justice, which requires consistent and 
equal treatment. Traditionally it has formed the basis of ‗direct 
discrimination‘ on guarantee in the UK, equal protection in the US 
Constitution and the Right to Equality in the Indian Constitution. It 
supports the position that personal traits or characteristics should 
be viewed as irrelevant in determining whether they have a right to 
some social benefit or not. The most blatant drawback of such 
approach is that it requires comparison, which forms the idea of a 
‗universal man‘ which can neglect the diversity in society.62 
The approach of formal equality in case of discrimination law, 
therefore, becomes color blind rather than being color conscious. 
Therefore this approach, and its juxtaposition on the modern 
society, becomes overly simplistic.  
In Withler v. Canada63, substantive equality has been explained as: 
Substantive equality, unlike formal equality, rejects 
the mere presence or absence of difference as an 
answer to differential treatment.  It insists on going 
behind the facade of similarities and differences. It 
asks not only what characteristics the different 
treatment is predicated upon, but also whether those 
characteristics are relevant considerations under the 
circumstances. The focus of the inquiry is on the 
actual impact of the impugned law, taking full 
account of social, political, economic and historical 
factors concerning the group.64 
                                                          
61ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA, 112-117, 1131a-1131b, (Ackrill, J. 
L. and Urmson J. O. eds, Oxford University Press), (1980). 
62The Ideas of Equality and Non-Discrimination: Formal and Substantive 
Equality, EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST,(Nov. 21 2017, 12:47 AM) 
http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/The%20Ideas%20of
%20Equality%20and%20Non-
discrimination,%20Formal%20and%20Substantive%20Equality.pdf. 
63Withler v. Canada, 2011 SCC 12 (Canada). 
64Id at 39. 
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As Nina A. Kohn highlights, the doctrine of formal equality has 
been severely criticized on the grounds that the pre-existing 
disadvantages of groups in the society radically differ and 
repeatedly applying consistent rules in such a scenario produces 
unequal results.65 
The contrast between formal and substantive equality as standards 
can be further illustrated by considering the law of prostitution.66 A 
substantive sex equality approach would decriminalize people sold 
in prostitution and strongly criminalize those who buy and sell 
them. 67Almost all those who would be prosecuted under such a 
scheme, as with rape laws, would predictably be men, either as 
sellers or buyers, which is substantively a male dominant behavior. 
Anyone bought or sold for sex would not be prosecuted, as they are 
substantively in a female or subordinate position, regardless of 
their sex. This gives a brief understanding about the need to 
consciously move towards substantive equality, while formulating 
laws to effectively address discrimination. 
III. 2 The problem with Intersectionality Theory 
The most perceptible problem that could be extrapolated is the 
problem of inequality within intersectionality. Susanne Knudsen 
argues that the multiple inequality markers may make way for a 
serious problem, that is, one category may be considered as more 
significant than others. She uses Crenshaw‘s metaphor of a ―cross-
section‖, and states that ―ethnicity may be chosen in favor of 
gender as the one road chosen, while the other road is left 
behind.‖68 Knudsen then talks about ―competing 
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J.L. & Feminism 1, 2-3 (2014). [Kohn] 
66 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Substantive Equality: A Perspective, 6 Minn. L. 
Rev 1, 1-27 (2012). 
67  Catharine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking, Prostitution, and Inequality, 46 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 301–04 (2011). 
68 Susanne Knudsen, Intersectionality - A Theoretical Inspiration in the 
Analysis of Minority Cultures and Identities in Textbooks, SCIELO 
COLUMBIA, 63 (Oct. 25, 2017, 2:30 PM), www.caen.iufm.fr/ 
colloque_iartem/pdf/knudsen.pdf+intersectionality+theory&hl=en&ct=cl
nk&cd=3&client=firef ox. 
Shwetank Sharma                       A Comparative analysis of Intersectionality 
21 
 
intersectionalities‖, where these are categorized on a hierarchy-
basis and gives an example of the 1970‘s America, where class and 
race had gained more significance than gender, which toppled 
later, and brought race and gender again back to the forefront. For 
instance, transgender people of color face extraordinary risks of 
discrimination69, yet, are too often ignored in mainstream 
discourses involving gender, race and sexuality. The author 
disagrees with Knudsen on some of the inherent flaws in the 
theory.  
These flaws cannot be used to totally negate the voice that 
intersectionality gives to plurality of experiences, which work 
towards attainment of substantive equality. Though it can be safely 
accepted that recognition of intersectional discrimination cannot be 
a panacea for all discrimination law and policy failures, there are 
various other reforms that need to be addressed and 
accommodated to strive for substantive equality which might go 
beyond the purview of this Article. The author would introduce 
and make preliminary suggestions on Martha Fineman‘s 
Vulnerability Theory, which makes a great argument for expansive 
social welfare laws and how vulnerability fits in the design of 
discrimination law. 
IV. Vulnerability Theory: A Post-Identity Approach 
This theory stems from the contentions around the role of the State 
as the allocator of the resources among its subjects. The questions 
aren‘t raised just on how the allocation must be done but also on 
the extent of such allocation and whether the State is under any 
obligation.70 Such concerns developed only after there was a shift in 
the policy-making from Laissez Faire to Welfare State. Though the 
job of redistribution of resources through taxation and social 
welfare programs was accepted, it was done only as a choice, not as 
                                                          
69 Transgender Europe‘s, Trans Murder Monitoring Project, TGEU, (Oct. 26, 
2017, 4:00 AM) http://www.transrespect-transphobia.org/en_US/tvt-
project/tmm-results/idahot-2015.htm. - reports that 1,701 trans-people 
have been murdered globally between 2008 and 2014. 
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an obligation.71 The only job performed by the government, as 
discussed earlier, was to prevent unjust discrimination and ensure 
equal treatment of all, in the eyes of law. 
Martha Fineman, while introducing this theory for the first time72 
starts the discussion from the question of how the resources must be 
allocated to achieve substantive equality. 
―It proposes that vulnerability is inherent to the human condition, 
and that governments therefore have a responsibility to respond 
affirmatively to that vulnerability by ensuring that all people have 
equal access to the societal institutions.‖73 
The theory aims to replace the liberal subject of State with a 
vulnerable subject. While a liberal subject is a competent social 
actor capable of simultaneous multiple identities, a vulnerable 
subject is anchored by dependency and absence of capacity74 
which, according to her, is all-pervading. It, quintessentially, delves 
into the concept of individual vulnerability, which includes harms 
of past, speculations about future, and immediate harm.75 
This approach moves beyond the societal identities of an 
individual. Fineman puts forward this thought in the following 
fashion: 
A vulnerability analysis greatly magnifies state 
responsibility for the institutions and structures the 
state constructs and utilizes. Vulnerability analysis 
demands that the state give equal regard to the 
shared vulnerability of all individuals, transcending 
the old identity categories as a limitation on the 
recognition that the state has a vital role to play in 
protection against discrimination.76 
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Therefore, according to her, the erstwhile application of liberal 
subject in welfare legislations addressing social disparities and 
discrimination, fails to justify differential allocation of privileges 
produced by social institutions. The current functioning model, as 
in the US, mires us in a battle of identity politics, where every gain 
by a minority individual, becomes a justification for abandoning 
the pursuit of substantive equality.77 
IV. 1 Difference between Intersectionality and Vulnerability 
At the outset, the author wishes to state that this distinction is 
purely academic in nature. Though intersectionality has been an 
important tool in the hands of feminists, this article specifically 
deals with its reception and accommodation by Courts adjudicating 
such discrimination claims. Vulnerability theory was developed to 
achieve a more responsive State and an egalitarian society. 
Therefore, the former functions on recognition of interplay of 
identities during instances of discrimination and their adjudication 
by Courts, and the latter primarily functions on the policy decisions 
and distribution of resources on the basis of universally inherent 
vulnerabilities, that sets to go beyond identities. However, 
vulnerability theory also falls prey to and succumbs to the identity 
politics, which it initially tends to surpass.  
A legitimate question that arises is that when applied to the same 
situation, these theories tend to clash and conflict with each other, 
as one is based on identity and the other transcends beyond 
identities. The author proposes that these theories can be 
reconciled, in the sense as mentioned above i.e. intersectionality 
should be used by courts to admit claims of discrimination, where 
more than one identity is at play and Vulnerability should be used 
as a broad principle underlying policies of the State, to address 
various vulnerabilities like old age, which are universally present 
and beyond specific ―protected‖ identities or characteristics, like 
those mentioned in Article 15 viz. race, caste, gender, place of birth, 
religion, etc.  
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IV. 2 Criticism of Vulnerability Theory 
A vulnerability analysis magnifies a State‘s responsibility. But, even 
this approach has been marred by some significant flaws and has 
been, therefore, subjected to criticism by various scholars. First, 
much of Fineman‘s analysis is at an abstract level with no 
contemporary examples. Second, when Fineman tries to give a 
policy change in one of her works78, she resorts to an identity 
approach by identifying vulnerability, within the elderly 
population.79 Therefore, she tends to succumb to the same identity 
politics with which she began her analysis and later criticizes the 
same. Third, in her earlier work80 she is very skeptical of the value 
of autonomy for citizens. Therefore, she suggests reforms in form of 
overly-paternalistic laws, which range from voiding certain 
transactions entered into by older people, to treating the legal 
capacity of older adults as less absolute than that of younger 
adults.81 Such laws prove to be a deterrent towards substantive 
equality in the long run. There have been various instances where, 
even in India, paternalistic laws accompanied by a protectionist 
interpretation by Courts, have led to an atmosphere of depressed 
autonomy, especially, that of women in the light of discrimination 
law jurisprudence.   
In Air India v. Nergesh Meerza 82, the Supreme Court while 
discussing the Air India Employees Service Regulations on 
retirement of an air hostess from service on grounds of marriage, 
first pregnancy, and attainment of age of 35 years, upheld the 
condition of termination upon marriage within four years of 
service. This was done on the basis of family planning, improving 
health and maturity of the employee with growing age and hence 
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ensuring the success of marriage, as well as the economic costs of 
training the crew.83 
The fact that the Court yields to arguments such as 
allowing female air hostesses to mature, by delaying 
their marriage prospects to ensure successful 
marriages is based on a patronizing view of sex and 
gender and an appropriation of women‘s personal 
autonomy. It views women as incapable and in need 
of direction from the State.84 
Therefore, this case clearly shows the downside of a protectionist 
approach towards equality, and how, in the garb of a paternalistic 
legislation or provision, substantive equality can be compromised 
by non-recognition of discrimination. Though different in terms of 
object of inquiry (Fineman‘s analysis being on older adults, and 
Nergesh Meerza‘s  case on the rights of women), both show a 
rather disappointing consequence of a paternalistic approach 
towards law-making. 
Nevertheless, it can be safely stated that it is a probable alternative 
to the prevalent formal equality paradigm. But it needs to be kept 
in mind that while Vulnerability Theory can be employed to set up 
broad policies, unlike intersectionality, it cannot be helpful in 
choosing particular policies for achieving substantive equality. The 
tragedy of this theory is that if vulnerability is taken as an inherent 
characteristic of each individual and not defined on case by case 
basis, even this theory will simply be reduced into an identity 
based approach.  
V. Conclusion 
The purpose of this article has been to provide a prefatory 
understanding of the complex and layered concept of 
intersectionality. Starting from the birth of the concept, till its 
current manifestation, and its condition in various leading 
jurisdictions of the world, viz. US, UK and India; the author has 
analyzed the extent and degree of adaption, and its possible 
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contribution to substantive equality. While Intersectionality, 
quintessentially, is more sophisticated and complex than additive 
discrimination, the tragedy is that major jurisdictions are yet to 
move beyond the single-axis model to accommodate an additive 
claim, let alone an intersectional one. But, even intersectionality is 
not insulated from flaws, for example, it has a potential to create 
hierarchies amongst the identities, interplaying at the same time. 
Therefore, as expressed earlier it could not be a sole instrument to 
achieve the lofty ideals of substantive equality. Vulnerability theory 
comes across as a viable approach aimed towards taking the 
conversation beyond identities, and placing the focus on the innate 
vulnerabilities that are universally inherent in every individual. 
However, the theory has failed on account of its simplistic and 
paternalistic attitude, and over-protectionist approach. While 
Intersectionality can be a significant ideological and legislative shift 
that can be implemented by Courts, which can voice concerns of 
various marginalized communities, vulnerability theory can be a 
tool in setting broad policies concerning allocation and distribution 
of resources. Both can work simultaneously on different fronts, as 
each can be harmonized to fill the theoretical gaps left by the other. 
